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Abstract—Authentication based on passwords is used largely in applications for computer security and privacy. However, human
actions such as choosing bad passwords and inputting passwords in an insecure way are regarded as ”the weakest link” in the
authentication chain. Rather than arbitrary alphanumeric strings, users tend to choose passwords either short or meaningful for easy
memorization. With web applications and mobile apps piling up, people can access these applications anytime and anywhere with
various devices. This evolution brings great convenience but also increases the probability of exposing passwords to shoulder surfing
attacks. Attackers can observe directly or use external recording devices to collect users’ credentials. To overcome this problem, we
proposed a novel authentication system PassMatrix, based on graphical passwords to resist shoulder surfing attacks. With a one-time
valid login indicator and circulative horizontal and vertical bars covering the entire scope of pass-images, PassMatrix offers no hint for
attackers to figure out or narrow down the password even they conduct multiple camera-based attacks. We also implemented a
PassMatrix prototype on Android and carried out real user experiments to evaluate its memorability and usability. From the
experimental result, the proposed system achieves better resistance to shoulder surfing attacks while maintaining usability.
Index Terms—Graphical Passwords, Authentication, Shoulder Surfing Attack.
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1 INTRODUCTION
TEXTUAL passwords have been the most widely usedauthentication method for decades. Comprised of num-
bers and upper- and lower-case letters, textual passwords
are considered strong enough to resist against brute force
attacks. However, a strong textual password is hard to
memorize and recollect [1]. Therefore, users tend to choose
passwords that are either short or from the dictionary, rather
than random alphanumeric strings. Even worse, it is not
a rare case that users may use only one username and
password for multiple accounts [2]. According to an article
in Computer world, a security team at a large company
ran a network password cracker and surprisingly cracked
approximately 80% of the employees’ passwords within 30
seconds [3]. Textual passwords are often insecure due to the
difficulty of maintaining strong ones.
Various graphical password authentication schemes [4],
[5], [6], [7] were developed to address the problems and
weaknesses associated with textual passwords. Based on
some studies such as those in [8], [9], humans have a
better ability to memorize images with long-term memory
(LTM) than verbal representations. Image-based passwords
were proved to be easier to recollect in several user studies
[10], [11], [12]. As a result, users can set up a complex
authentication password and are capable of recollecting it
after a long time even if the memory is not activated period-
ically. However, most of these image-based passwords are
vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks (SSAs). This type of
attack either uses direct observation, such as watching over
someone’s shoulder or applies video capturing techniques
to get passwords, PINs, or other sensitive personal informa-
tion [13], [14], [15].
The human actions such as choosing bad passwords for
new accounts and inputting passwords in an insecure way
for later logins are regarded as the weakest link in the au-
thentication chain [16]. Therefore, an authentication scheme
should be designed to overcome these vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we present a secure graphical authentica-
tion system named PassMatrix that protects users from be-
coming victims of shoulder surfing attacks when inputting
passwords in public through the usage of one-time login
indicators. A login indicator is randomly generated for each
pass-image and will be useless after the session terminates.
The login indicator provides better security against shoulder
surfing attacks, since users use a dynamic pointer to point
out the position of their passwords rather than clicking on
the password object directly.
1.1 Motivation
As the mobile marketing statistics compilation by Danyl, the
mobile shipments had overtaken PC shipments in 2011, and
the number of mobile users also overtaken desktop users
at 2014, which closed to 2 billion [17]. However, shoulder
surfing attacks have posed a great threat to users’ privacy
and confidentiality as mobile devices are becoming indis-
pensable in modern life. People may log into web services
and apps in public to access their personal accounts with
their smart phones, tablets or public devices, like bank ATM.
Shoulder-surfing attackers can observe how the passwords
were entered with the help of reflecting glass windows, or
let alone monitors hanging everywhere in public places.
Passwords are exposed to risky environments, even if the
passwords themselves are complex and secure. A secure
authentication system should be able to defend against
shoulder surfing attacks and should be applicable to all
kinds of devices. Authentication schemes in the literature
such as those in [6], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24],
[25] are resistant to shoulder-surfing, but they have either
usability limitations or small password space. Some of them
are not suitable to be applied in mobile devices and most of
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them can be easily compromised to shoulder surfing attacks
if attackers use video capturing techniques like Google Glass
[15], [26]. The limitations of usability include issues such as
taking more time to log in, passwords being too difficult to
recall after a period of time, and the authentication method
being too complicated for users without proper education
and practice.
In 2006, Wiedenbeck et al. proposed PassPoints [7] in
which the user picks up several points (3 to 5) in an
image during the password creation phase and re-enters
each of these pre-selected click-points in a correct order
within its tolerant square during the login phase. Com-
paring to traditional PIN and textual passwords, the Pass-
Points scheme substantially increases the password space
and enhances password memorability. Unfortunately, this
graphical authentication scheme is vulnerable to shoulder
surfing attacks. Hence, based on the PassPoints, we add the
idea of using one-time session passwords and distractors
to develop our PassMatrix authentication system that is
resistant to shoulder surfing attacks.
1.2 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the
backgrounds of related techniques about graphical authen-
tication schemes and Section 3 describes attack models. The
proposed PassMatrix is presented in Section 4. The user
study and its results are available in Section 5 and Section
6 respectively. A security analysis is discussed in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In the past several decades, a lot of research on password
authentication has been done in the literature. Among all of
these proposed schemes, this paper focuses mainly on the
graphical-based authentication systems. To keep this paper
concise, we will give a brief review of the most related
schemes that were mentioned in the previous section. Many
other schemes such as those in [27], [28], [29], [30], [31]
may have good usability, they are not graphical-based and
need additional support from extra hardware such as audio,
multi-touch monitor, vibration sensor, or gyroscope, etc.
In the early days, the graphical capability of handheld
devices was weak; the color and pixel it could show was
limited. Under this limitation, the Draw-a-Secret (DAS) [6]
technique was proposed by Jermyn et al. in 1999, where the
user is required to re-draw a pre-defined picture on a 2D
grid. We directly extract the figure from [6] and show it in
Figure 1(b). If the drawing touches the same grids in the
same sequence, then the user is authenticated. Since then,
the graphical capability of handheld devices has steadily
and ceaselessly improved with the advances in science and
technology. In 2005, Susan Wiedenbeck et al. introduced a
graphical authentication scheme PassPoints [7], and at that
time, handheld devices could already show high resolution
color pictures. Using the PassPoint scheme, the user has
to click on a set of pre-defined pixels on the predestined
photo, as shown in Figure 1(a) (this figure is extracted
from [7]), with a correct sequence and within their tolerant
squares during the login stage. Moreover, Marcos et al.
also extended the DAS based on finger-drawn doodles and
pseudosignatures in recent mobile device [32], [33]. This au-
thentication system is based on features which are extracted
from the dynamics of the gesture drawing process (e.g.,
speed or acceleration). These features contain behavioral
biometric characteristic. In other words, the attacker would
have to imitate not only what the user draws, but also
how the user draws it. However, these three authentication
schemes are still all vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks
as they may reveal the graphical passwords directly to some
unknown observers in public.
Fig. 1. (a) Pixel squares selected by users as authentication passwords
in PassPoints [7]. (b) Authentication password drew by users and the
raw bits recorded by the system database [6].
In addition to graphical authentication schemes, there
was some research on the extension of conventional per-
sonal identification number (PIN) entry authentication sys-
tems. In 2004, Roth et al. [34] presented an approach for
PIN entry against shoulder surfing attacks by increasing
the noise to observers. In their approach, the PIN digits
are displayed in either black or white randomly in each
round. The user must respond to the system by identifying
the color for each password digit. After the user has made
a series of binary choices (black or white), the system can
figure out the PIN number the user intended to enter by
intersecting the user’s choices. This approach could confuse
the observers if they just watch the screen without any help
of video capturing devices. However, if observers are able
to capture the whole authentication process, the passwords
can be cracked easily.
In order to defend the shoulder surfing attacks with
video capturing, FakePointer [35] was introduced in 2008
by T. Takada. We use Figure 2 (from [35]) below to show
the usage of FakePointer. In addition to the PIN number,
the user will get a new ”answer indicator” each time for
the authentication process at a bank ATM. In other words,
the user has two secrets for authentication: a PIN as a fixed
secret and an answer indicator as a disposable secret. The
answer indicator is a sequence of n shapes if the PIN has
n digits. At each login session, the FakePointer interface
will present the user an image of a numeric keypad with 10
numbers (similar to the numeric keypad for phones), with
each key (number) on top of a randomly picked shape. The
numeric keys, but not the shapes, can be moved circularly
using the left or right arrow keys. During authentication,
the user must repeatedly move numeric keys circularly as
shown in the leftmost figure in Figure 2, until the first digit
of the PIN overlaps the first shape of the answer indicator
on the keypad and then confirm a selection by pressing
the space key. This operation is repeated until all the PIN
digits are entered and confirmed. This approach is quite
robust even when the attacker captures the whole authen-
tication process. However, there is still room to improve
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the password space. For example, if the device used for
authentication is a smartphone, a tablet or a computer rather
than a bank ATM, the password space can be enlarged
substantially since the PIN could be any combination of
alphanumeric characters rather than just numeric digits.
Fig. 2. FakePointer, where a user can move a numeric key layout
circularly using right and left arrow keys. [35]
Wiedenback et al. [36] described a graphical password
entry scheme in 2006, as shown in Figure 3(b) (the figure
is extracted from [36]). This scheme is resistant to shoulder
surfing attacks using a convex hull method. The user needs
to recognize a set of pass-icons on the screen and clicks
inside the convex hull formed by all these pass-icons. In
order to make the password hard to guess, a large number
of other different icons can be inserted into the screen
to increase the password space. However, a large number
of objects will crowd the display and may make objects
indistinguishable.
In 2010, David Kim et al. [25] proposed a visual authen-
tication scheme for tabletop interfaces called ”Color Rings”,
as shown in Figure 3(a) (the figure is extracted from [25]),
where the user is assigned i authentication (key) icons,
which are collectively assigned one of the four color-rings:
red, green, blue, or pink. During login, i grids of icons are
provided, with 72 icons being displayed per grid. There is
only one key icon presented in each grid. The user must
drag all four rings (ideally with index finger and thumb
from two hands) concurrently and place them in the grid.
The distinct key icon should be captured by the correct color
ring while the rest of rings just make decoy selections. The
user confirms a selection by dropping the rings in position.
The rings are large enough to include more than one icon
and can thus obfuscate the direct observer. Unfortunately,
these kinds of passwords can be cracked by intersecting
the user’s selections in each login because the color of the
assigned ring is fixed and a ring can include at most seven
icons. Thus, the attacker only requires a limited number of
trials to guess the user’s password.
Fig. 3. (a) Color Rings method [25]. (b) Convex Hull method [36].
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT, ATTACK MODEL AND
ASSUMPTIONS
3.1 Problem Statement
With the increasing amount of mobile devices and web
services, users can access their personal accounts to send
confidential business emails, upload photos to albums in
the cloud or remit money from their e-bank account anytime
and anywhere. While logging into these services in public,
they may expose their passwords to unknown parties un-
consciously. People with malicious intent could watch the
whole authentication procedure through omnipresent video
cameras and surveillance equipment, or even a reflected
image on a window [37]. Once the attacker obtains the
password, they could access personal accounts and that
would definitely pose a great threat to one’s assets. Shoulder
surfing attacks have gained more and more attention in the
past decade. The following lists the research problems we
would like to address in this study:
1) The problem of how to perform authentication in
public so that shoulder surfing attacks can be allevi-
ated.
2) The problem of how to increase password space
than that of the traditional PIN.
3) The problem of how to efficiently search exact pass-
word objects during the authentication phase.
4) The problem of requiring users to memorize extra
information or to perform extra computation during
authentication.
5) The problem of limited usability of authentication
schemes that can be applied to some devices only.
3.2 Attack Model
3.2.1 Shoulder Surfing Attacks
Based on previous research [20], [21], [25], [34], [35], users’
actions such as typing from their keyboard, or clicking on
the pass-images or pass-points in public may reveal their
passwords to people with bad intention. In this paper, based
on the means the attackers use, we categorize shoulder-
surfing attacks into three types as below:
1) Type-I: Naked eyes.
2) Type-II: Video captures the entire authentication
process only once.
3) Type-III: Video captures the entire authentication
process more than once.
The latter types of attacks require more effort and tech-
niques from attackers. Thus, if an authentication scheme is
able to resist against these attacks, it is also secure against
previous types of attacks. Some of the proposed authentica-
tion schemes [4], [5], [6], [7], [25], [38], including traditional
text-password and PIN, are vulnerable to shoulder surfing
Type-I attacks and thus are also subject to Type-II and Type-
III attacks. These schemes reveal passwords to attackers as
soon as users enter their passwords by directly pressing
or clicking on specific items on the screen. Other schemes
such as those in [19], [34] can resist against Type-I but are
vulnerable to Type-II and Type-III attacks since the attackers
can crack passwords by intersecting their video captures
from multiple steps of the entire authentication process.
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, published by IEEE. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1109/TDSC.2016.2539942
3.2.2 Smudge Attacks
According to a previous study [39], authentication schemes
that require users to touch or fling on computer monitors
or display screens during the login phase are vulnerable to
smudge attacks. The attacker can obtain the user’s password
easily by observing the smudge left on the touch screen (see
Figure 4 which is directly extracted from [39]).
Fig. 4. (a) Android pattern screen lock in which a user draws a personal
unlock pattern that connects at least four dots on screen [39]. (b) The
residue from fingerprints left on the screen [39].
3.3 Assumptions
In this paper, we do not discuss the habitual movements and
the preference of users that the attacker may take advantage
of to figure out the potential passwords. In addition, we
have four assumptions in this study:
1) Any communication between the client device and
the server is protected by SSL so that packets or
information will not be eavesdropped or intercepted
by attackers during transmission.
2) The server and the client devices in our authentica-
tion system are trustworthy.
3) The keyboard and the entire screen of mobile de-
vices are difficult to protect, but a small area (around
1.5 cm2) is easy to be protected from malicious
people who might shoulder surf passwords.
4) Users are able to register an account in a place
that is safe from observers with bad intention or
surveillance cameras that are not under proper man-
agement.
4 PASSMATRIX
To overcome (1) the security weakness of the traditional
PIN method, (2) the easiness of obtaining passwords by
observers in public, and (3) the compatibility issues to
devices, we introduced a graphical authentication system
called PassMatrix. In PassMatrix, a password consists of
only one pass-square per pass-image for a sequence of
n images. The number of images (i.e., n) is user-defined.
Figure 5 demonstrates the proposed scheme, in which the
first pass-square is located at (4, 8) in the first image, the
second pass-square is on the top of the smoke in the second
image at (7, 2), and the last pass-square is at (7, 10) in the
third image.
In PassMatrix, users choose one square per image for a
sequence of n images rather than n squares in one image as
that in the PassPoints [7] scheme. Based on the user study of
Cued Click Points (CCP) [40] proposed by Chiasson et al.,
Fig. 5. A password contains three images (n=3) with a pass square in
each. The pass squares are shown as the orange-filled area in each
image.
the CCP method does a good job in helping users recollect
and remember their passwords. If the user clicks on an
incorrect region within the image, a different image will
be shown to give the user a warning feedback. However,
aiming at alleviating shoulder surfing attacks, we do not
recommend this approach since the feedback that is given
to users might also be obtained by attackers.
Due to the fact that people do not register a new account
or set up a new screen lock frequently, we assume that these
setup events can be done in a safe environment rather than
in public places. Thus, users can pick up pass-squares by
simply touching at or clicking on them during the registra-
tion phase.
4.1 Overview
PassMatrix is composed of the following components (see
Figure 6):
• Image Discretization Module
• Horizontal and Vertical Axis Control Module
• Login Indicator generator Module
• Communication Module
• Password Verification Module
• Database
Fig. 6. Overview of the PassMatrix system.
Image Discretization Module. This module divides each
image into squares, from which users would choose one as
the pass-square. As shown in Figure 5, an image is divided
into a 7 × 11 grid. The smaller the image is discretized,
the larger the password space is. However, the overly
concentrated division may result in recognition problem of
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specific objects and increase the difficulty of user interface
operations on palm-sized mobile devices. Hence, in our
implementation, a division was set at 60-pixel intervals in
both horizontal and vertical directions, since 60 pixels2 is
the best size to accurately select specific objects on touch
screens.
Login Indicator Generator Module. This module gener-
ates a login indicator consisting of several distinguishable
characters (such as alphabets and numbers) or visual mate-
rials (such as colors and icons) for users during the authen-
tication phase. In our implementation, we used characters
A to G and 1 to 11 for a 7 × 11 grid. Both letters and
numbers are generated randomly and therefore a different
login indicator will be provided each time the module is
called. The generated login indicator can be given to users
visually or acoustically. For the former case, the indicator
could be shown on the display (see Figure 7(a)) directly
or through another predefined image. If using a predefined
image, for instance, if the user chooses the square (5, 9) in the
image as in Figure 7(b), then the login indicator will be (E,
11). For the acoustical delivery, the indicator can be received
by an audio signal through the ear buds or Bluetooth. One
principle is to keep the indicators secret from people other
than the user, since the password (the sequence of pass-
squares) can be reconstructed easily if the indicators are
known.
Fig. 7. (a) Obtain the login indicator (E,11) directly. (b) Obtain the login
indicator through a predefined image.
Horizontal and Vertical Axis Control Module. There
are two scroll bars: a horizontal bar with a sequence of
letters and a vertical bar with a sequence of numbers. This
control module provides drag and fling functions for users
to control both bars. Users can fling either bar using their
finger to shift one alphanumeric at a time. They can also
shift several checks at a time by dragging the bar for a
distance. Both bars are circulative, i.e., if the user shifts the
horizontal bar in Figure 8(c) to left by three checks, it will
become the bar shown in Figure 8(d). The bars are used
to implicitly point out (or in other words, align the login
indicator to) the location of the user’s pass-square.
Communication Module. This module is in charge of all
the information transmitted between the client devices and
the authentication server. Any communication is protected
by SSL (Secure Socket Layer) protocol [41] and thus, is safe
from being eavesdropped and intercepted.
Password Verification Module. This module verifies the
user password during the authentication phase. A pass-
Fig. 8. Horizontal scroll bar (on the right/blue) and vertical bar (on the
left/green).
square acts similar to a password digit in the text-based
password system. The user is authenticated only if each
pass-square in each pass-image is correctly aligned with the
login indicator. The details of how to align a login indicator
to a pass-square will be described in the next section.
Database. The database server contains several tables
that store user accounts, passwords (ID numbers of pass-
images and the positions of pass-squares), and the time
duration each user spent on both registration phase and
login phase. PassMatrix has all the required privileges to
perform operations like insert, modify, delete and search.
4.2 PassMatrix
PassMatrix’s authentication consists of a registration phase
and an authentication phase as described below:
4.2.1 Registration phase
Figure 9 is the flowchart of the registration phase. At this
stage, the user creates an account which contains a user-
name and a password. The password consists of only one
pass-square per image for a sequence of n images. The
number of images (i.e., n) is decided by the user after
considering the trade-off between security and usability of
the system [42]. The only purpose of the username is to
give the user an imagination of having a personal account.
The username can be omitted if PassMatrix is applied to
authentication systems like screen lock. The user can either
choose images from a provided list or upload images from
their device as pass-images. Then the user will pick a pass-
square for each selected pass-image from the grid, which
was divided by the image discretization module. The user
repeats this step until the password is set.
4.2.2 Authentication phase
Figure 10 is the flowchart of the authentication phase. At this
stage, the user uses his/her username, password and login
indicators to log into PassMatrix. The following describes
all the steps in detail:
1) The user inputs his/her username which was cre-
ated in the registration phase.
2) A new indicator comprised of a letter and a number
is created by the login indicator generator module.
The indicator will be shown when the user uses
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Fig. 9. The flowchart of registration phase in PassMatrix.
his/her hand to form a circle and then touch the
screen. In this case, the indicator is conveyed to the
user by visual feedback. The indicator can also be
delivered through a predefined image or by audio
feedback that we have mentioned in the previous
section.
3) Next, the first pass-image will be shown on the
display, with a horizontal bar and a vertical bar
on its top and left respectively. To respond to the
challenge, the user flings or drags the bars to align
the pre-selected pass-square of the image with the
login indicator. For example, if the indicator is (E,
11) and the pass-square is at (5, 7) in the grid of the
image, the user shifts the character ”E” to the 5th
column on the horizontal bar and ”11” to the 7th
row on the vertical bar (see Figure 12).
4) Repeat step 2 and step 3 for each pre-selected pass-
image.
5) The communication module gets user account infor-
mation from the server through HttpRequest POST
method.
6) Finally, for each image, the password verification
module verifies the alignment between the pass-
square and the login indicator. Only if all the align-
ments are correct in all images, the user is allowed
to log into PassMatrix.
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND USER STUDY
Although the PassMatrix prototype was implemented on an
Android system which has a small screen, it is not limited
to the applications on small screen devices, for example
screen locking. In fact, it could be applied to a wide range
of authentication scenarios. For instance, user account login
in Windows 8, email account login on web browser, and
Fig. 10. The flowchart of authentication phase in PassMatrix.
application login/unlock on Android OS. It can also be
applied to any client device such as personal computers,
laptops, tablets, mobile phones, or bank ATM due to the fact
that the method of authentication is simple and the entire
authentication process can be completed by only touching
or clicking on the screen.
In our implementation, we assumed that users down-
load an application from Google Play [43] and register an
account for later login to use the service. Since Android [44]
is an open source operating system based on Linux kernel
and is widely used in mobile devices such as tablet PCs and
smart phones, we implemented a PassMatrix prototype on
Android and carried out user experiments to evaluate its
memorability and usability. In this section we will describe
our PassMatrix implementation and the user study exper-
imental design, environment, participants and procedures.
The result of the user study will be shown in Section 6.
5.1 Implementation
The PassMatrix prototype was built with Android SDK 2.3.3
since it was the mainstream version of the distribution in
2012 [45]. After connecting to the Internet, users can register
an account, log in a few times in practice mode, and then
log in for the experiment with a client’s device (see Figure
11(a)). In the client side of our prototype, we used XML to
build the user interface and used JAVA and Android API to
implement functions, including username checking, pass-
images listing, image discretization, pass-squares selection,
login indicator delivery, and the horizontal and vertical bars
circulation. In the server side of our implementation, we
used PHP and MySQL to store and fetch registered accounts
to/from the database to handle the password verification.
Although in our proposed system we mentioned that
users can import their own images, we used a list of 24 fixed
test images in our experiment (see Figure 11(b)). Each image
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Fig. 11. (a) The Main page of PassMatrix, users can register an account,
practice or start to log in for experiment. (b) Users can choose from a
list of 24 images as their pass-images. (c) There are 7 × 11 squares in
each image, from which users choose one as the pass-square.
is displayed in a size of 420 × 660 pixels and is discretized
into 60 × 60 pixel squares. Thus, users have 7 × 11 squares
to select in each image (see Figure 11(c)). After a user selects
three to five images with one pass-square per image, the
password will be stored as a list of coordinates in a database
table (i.e., the locations of those selected pass-squares in the
7×11 grid). The password space depends on the number of
images set by users. For instance, if a user creates an account
with four images, the password space is (7× 11)4.
Fig. 12. (a) A visual way for users to obtain a one-time valid login indi-
cator. (b) The permutations of alphanumerics in horizontal and vertical
bars are randomly generated for each image. (c) Users can shift the
bars to the correct position so that the login indicator aligns with the
pass-square.
The first step in the login phase is getting the one-
time valid login indicator from the system. There are many
ways to obtain the indicator and we’ve illustrated several
examples in Section 4.1. In our implementation, we adopted
the simplest way: grasping the hand with a little space left
in the center and then touching the screen of smart phones
(see Figure 12(a)). To protect against shoulder surfing, the
indicator is not shown until the hand touches the screen and
will vanish immediately when the hand leaves the screen.
The number of elements on both the horizontal and
vertical bars depends on the discretization degree of the
images. In our implementation, there are 7 letters (from
A to G) and 11 numbers (from 1 to 11) on the horizontal
bar and on the vertical bar, respectively. They are used
to align the one-time indicator with the pass-square in
each pass-image during the authentication phase. In order
to obfuscate and thus hide the alignment patterns from
observers, we randomly shuffled the elements on both bars
in each pass-image and let users shift them to the right
position (see Figure 12(b) and (c)). We implemented two bar-
shifting functions: dragging and flinging. Since the entire
bar is shiftable and can be circulated on either side (i.e., bi-
directional and circulative), users do not need to place their
finger on a specific element in order to move it.
5.2 User Study
In this section, we introduce our user study experimental
design, environment, participants and the detailed proce-
dure that evaluates the accuracy and usability of PassMatrix.
5.2.1 Experimental Design
We conducted a user study for the proposed system to
evaluate two performance metrics:
• Password memorability/recollection: How well do
users remember their password and can they log into
the system successfully after a period of time since
registration?
• Usability: We measured the users’ experience on
PassMatrix, which includes the total time consumed
for both registration and authentication, the success-
ful login rate if they know their passwords, and the
number of times users use the bar control functions
to shift the elements to the right position during the
authentication phase.
In order to analyze the memorability, we asked the
experiment participants to register a PassMatrix account
first and then come back to log into their account two weeks
later. We marked a login attempt as a failure if the number
of retries exceeded 5 times.
To analyze the usability, we recorded the time each par-
ticipant spent on both registration and login to see whether
the PassMatrix’s authentication is time-consuming. We also
recorded the number of times participants fling their finger
to shift the horizontal and vertical bars to measure the
effort they have to make during the authentication phase.
Furthermore, to calculate the successful login rate, we asked
the participants to log into PassMatrix three times right
after they register an account in the first session and re-log
into the system another three times in the second session
(two weeks later). We can use these statistic data from
each participant to evaluate how well users operate on the
system’s authentication interface. The detailed procedure is
described in Section 5.2.4 and the results will be shown in
Section 6.
5.2.2 Environment
We deployed and installed PassMatrix.apk on Samsung
Nexus S with Android version 2.3.6 and a display size of
480× 800 pixels. MySQL 5.0.51 and PHP were installed on
a server with Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Quad CPU, 3GB RAM
and Ubuntu 8.04.4 OS.
5.2.3 Participants
30 novice users (11 females and 19 males), who are un-
familiar with PassMatrix or even graphical authentication
schemes, were recruited from our university to participate
in this study. At the time of this study, the participants are
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24.53 years old on average (StdDev=3.14), in which three
of them are post-doctors and the majority of the rest are
graduate students. All participants are either in Computer
Science, Information System Management or other informa-
tion technology majors. 76.67% of them have a background
of information security. As Figure 13(b) shows, 73 % of
participants have less than one year or no experience at all
of using smart phones, whereas 20% of participants have
more than one but less than two years of experience and
the final 7% are veteran users with more than two years
of experience. The survey showed that in the past, they
went through authentication processes on an average of 12.6
times a day in public (see Figure 13(a)).
Fig. 13. Trends of (a) Number of times a participant went through
authentication processes in public per day, and (b) User experience in
smart phones with touch screens.
5.2.4 Procedure
Participants carried out the usability study in two sessions -
an initial session and a follow-up session. In the first session,
participants were asked to create an account in PassMatrix.
The following describes how the first session was conducted
in detail.
1) Introduction phase: We explained the basic idea
and purpose of PassMatrix with a presentation and
showed participants how to use the system with
some simple animations.
2) Registration phase: Participants created an account
consisting of a username and a password in Pass-
Matrix. In the introduction phase, participants were
educated by our tutorial so that
a) They knew that they should register their
account in a private place. Hence it is safe
to choose pass-squares by simply clicking on
them during the registration phase.
b) They knew that they should choose the pass-
squares that do not contain light objects but
are meaningful to them.
c) They knew that they should re-choose the
chosen square in each pass-image for confir-
mation.
d) They knew that they should set three or more
pass-images.
3) Practice phase: Participants were told to log into
their account in a practice mode. They repeated this
step until they thought they knew how to control
the horizontal and vertical bars. The PassMatrix
system gives the authentication feedback to users
only after the whole password input process is
completed, not in between each pass-image.
4) Login phase: After practicing, participants were re-
quested to log into their account formally in a login
mode.
5) Participants were also asked to answer a short de-
mographic questionnaire about some simple per-
sonal data and their personal experience on mobile
phones or authentication systems.
6) Each participant was then given an answer sheet,
containing the information of a third person’s two
previous login records. Participants were asked to
figure out the third person’s pass-squares from
these two given login records. An incentive gift
was provided if they are able to successfully crack
the password in ten tries (i.e., ten guesses on the
answer sheet). Two weeks were given to crack the
password.
In the follow-up session (two weeks later), participants
were asked to
1) log into PassMatrix repeatedly until three successful
logins,
2) answer another questionnaire sheet about their user
experience on PassMatrix, and
3) turn in their answer sheet for the password cracking
experiment.
6 COLLECTED RESULTS
We analyzed the collected data from our experiments and
surveys to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed sys-
tem. The results are presented in two perspectives: accuracy
and usability. The accuracy perspective focuses on the suc-
cessful login rates in both sessions, including the practice
logins. The usability perspective is measured by the amount
of time users spent in each PassMatrix phase. The results
of these two analyses strongly suggested that PassMatrix is
practical to use. At the end of this section, we also presented
the statistics of the survey data from participants about their
personal background and user experience on smart phones
and PassMatrix.
6.1 Accuracy
In the practice phase of the first session, participants prac-
ticed the login process on an average of 4 times ranging
from 1 to 14 (excluding one outlier) and then moved onto
the authentication (login) phase. As we defined in the pre-
vious section, participants can keep trying to log in to their
account until they have failed six times. In other words, a
successful attempt means that a user, in less than or equal
to six tries, is able to pass the authentication with a correct
password. If all six tries failed, this attempt will be marked
as failure. Below, we define two terms First Accuracy and
Total Accuracy that were used in our experiment:
First Accuracy =
Successful attempts in first Try
Total attempts
(1)
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Total Accuracy =
Successful attempts
Total attempts
(2)
TABLE 1
The accuracy of practice/authentication(login) in two sessions
First session Second session
First Total First Total
Practice Phase 60.00% 100% - -
Login Phase 86.67% 100% 66.67% 93.33%
Table 1 shows the First Accuracy and the Total Accuracy
of the practice and login phases in both sessions with 30
participants. On average, 3.2 pass-images were selected by
each participant. The result shows that both the First and
Total Accuracies in the first session are higher than those in
the second session. In the first session, 26 out of 30 (86.67%)
participants were able to log into the system successfully
with just one try and all of them were authenticated within
six tries (i.e., the Total Accuracy is 100%). After more than
two weeks (for an average of 16.3 days), the First Accuracy
in the second session was down to 66.67%, but the Total
Accuracy is still 93.33%. We surveyed the participants for
the possible reasons of the big drop in the First Accuracy
and also analyzed those failed login attempts in the second
session. We found out that the participants did not really
forget their passwords. Most of them still remember the
locations of their pass-squares. However, they accidentally
shifted the horizontal or vertical bar to a wrong position
and submitted without checking. Most of them could log
into the system successfully in the very next try and that is
why the Total Accuracy (93.33%) is much higher than the
First Accuracy (66.67%) in the second session.
Table 2 shows the average number of re-tries until the
user finally logged in successfully. Even after more than
two weeks, participants were able to log into the system
successfully in an average of 0.64 (Median=0) re-tries, or
in other words a total of 1.64 tries. 25 out of 30 (83.33%)
participants were able to log into their account within three
tries. For the rest, 4 participants logged in successfully
within ten tries and only one participant failed to log in
after trying ten times. According to the data recorded, these
5 participants failed to log in within 3 tries were all having
trouble to pass only one of the three pass-images they set in
the registration phase.
In summary, we conclude that the passwords of our
PassMatrix are easy to memorize. Users can log into the
system with only 1.64 (Median=1) authentication requests
on average, and the Total Accuracy of all login trials is
93.33% even after two weeks.
TABLE 2
The mean, median and standard deviation of the number of retries
in a successful attempt.
First Session Second Session
Mean Median S.D Mean Median S.D
Practice Phase 0.41 0 0.50 - - -
Login Phase 0.13 0 0.35 0.64 0 2.64
6.2 Usability
We counted the number of shifts and the elapsed time per
pass-image in our experiment to measure the usability of
our PassMatrix in practice.
TABLE 3
The mean, median and standard deviation of total time in the
registration phase
Registration(1st)
Mean Median S.D
Total Time(s) 106.6 90.5 55.58
Table 3 shows the elapsed time that participants con-
sumed in the registration phase. The registration took 1
minute and 46 seconds on average. Though it seems the
average registration time is a bit lengthy in records, 73.33%
of participants felt that the registration process is actu-
ally not time consuming and 10% of them said that they
spent most of their registration time in finding pass-squares
that are meaningful to them. Based on the survey data
from participants, we concluded that the time required
for registration is acceptable to users in practice. During
registration, participants can choose 3 to 5 pass-images as
their passwords. In our experiment, all but five participants
chose 3 images (mean=3.2 images). The average time each
user spent on practice and login (see Table 4) in the first
session was 47.86 seconds and 31.31 seconds respectively.
The required time to log into PassMatrix is reduced by 16.55
seconds after practicing 4 times on average to get familiar
with the shifting (i.e., dragging and flinging) operations
on touch screens. The results are good due to the fact
that 73% of participants have either no or less than one
year of experience of using smart phones (see Figure 13).
Furthermore, even after more than two weeks (16.3 days on
average), the average login time was still as low as 37.11
seconds, not far away from that (31.11 seconds) in the first
session. The reason that the time was slightly increased was
because participants needed to recall their passwords. A
survey showed that the time spent in the login process is
acceptable to 83.33% of participants. They felt that spending
a little bit extra time is worthwhile if the authentication
system can protect their passwords from being seen by
others peeking over their shoulders.
For the shifting operations, while aligning a login in-
dicator to a pass-square in each pass-image (see Table 4),
there is no significant difference (F=3.6, p> 0.05) in the
number of such operations in the practice phase and in
the login phase in both sessions, where F means the F-test
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-test) and p means the p-
value (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P-value). Because the
login indicator is randomly generated for each pass-image
and elements in both the horizontal bar and vertical bar are
also randomly shuffled, the number of shifting operations
used to move the login indicator to the right position may
differ as well. There are two types of shifting operations,
which are dragging (aligning the login indicator with the
pass-square in a single move) and flinging (fast finger
movement on the screen; only shifting one unit at a time). As
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shown in the experimental results, participants only shifted
4 to 5 times per pass-image on average.
TABLE 4
The mean, median and standard deviation of total time and the
number of shifts in practice/authentication phase
Practice(1st) Login(1st) Login(2nd)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Time(s) 47.86 41 31.31 29.5 37.11 34
shift 5.67 5 4.91 5 4.9 4
In summary, the experimental results showed that all
participants can operate the login process through the Pass-
Matrix’s authentication interface. Thus, our PassMatrix is
friendly to use in practice. Users may need to spend more
time to log into PassMatrix in the practice phase (47.86
seconds on average) right after registering their accounts.
However, they can log into the system more quickly, even
two weeks after registration (in between 31.31 seconds and
37.11 seconds). The results also showed that users could
easily control the horizontal and vertical bars to align lo-
gin indicators with pass-squares. Hence, our PassMatrix is
practical in the perspectives of easy-to-use and efficiency.
TABLE 5
Questionnaire responses. Scores are 1 to 5.
Questions Mean Median
Some information is exposed when authenticat-
ing in public.
4.13 4
I would have serious loss if my passwords were
cracked.
4 4
PassMatrix can protect my passwords from be-
ing attacked by SSA.
4.23 4
Compared to text passwords and PIN, PassMa-
trix is more secure.
4.27 4
PassMatrix is secure and trustable. 4.27 4
It’s difficult to find out the pass-square of others
even if I had screen shots or videos of one’s login
process.
4.27 4
It’s easy and fast to create an account in Pass-
Matrix.
3.87 4
In general, PassMatrix is a user-friendly system
and is easy to use.
4.2 4
The time consumed for using PassMatrix is ac-
ceptable.
4.07 4
The login indicator is clear and easy to memo-
rize temporarily.
3.9 4
The login indicator is safe from being peeped at
by others.
4 4
I tend to choose squares that are eye-catching. 3.83 4
I tend to choose squares that are obtrusive. 2.6 2
6.3 Questionnaires
Participants were asked to fill out questions about their
personal background and a set of Likert-scale questions
about their experience in using PassMatrix at the end of the
first and the second sessions. We adopted five-point Likert
scales, in which 1 represents a strong disagreement and 5
indicates a strong agreement.
Table 5 shows all the questions with their mean and
median scores. As the result shows, participants felt it is
insecure to use traditional text passwords or PIN methods,
and they believed that using PassMatrix to log in can protect
their passwords from being shoulder surfing attacked. For
the user experience on PassMatrix, the mean scores of the
series of questions are high, ranging from 3.87 to 4.20. All
participants agreed that PassMatrix is easy to use and the
majority of them (93.33%) considered the time spent (or in
other words, complexity) for the PassMatrix’s login process
is acceptable. For an in-depth investigation at the number
of pass-images users may accept in different authentication
scenarios, see Figure 14, we found out that users tended to
set only one pass-image as their password for screen lock
in their mobile phones, 2 to 3 for OS user login and e-mail
service login, and 5 or more for bank accounts.
We told participants to choose meaningful pass-squares
to be their passwords and some of them really did. They
spent more time in finding and memorizing special squares
meaningful to them. However, when being asked how they
decided pass-squares, most of them expressed that they
chose a square that is conspicuous in an image. This might
result in hot-spot problems [46] and we will discuss this
issue in the next section.
In summary, the overall feedback from the participants
is good. They have no trouble using PassMatrix to log in
and they believe PassMatrix can protect their pass-squares
from being known by others when operating in public. In
addition, the required time for login is acceptable to most of
them and we believe the login time will be decreased when
users gain more experience in using PassMatrix.
Fig. 14. Number of pass-images users may accept in different authenti-
cation scenarios.
6.4 Cracking PassMatrix
In order to brainstorm different ways, if any, to crack
PassMatrix through shoulder surfing attacks, we aggregated
the pass-images and pass-squares chosen by participants
during the registration phase and randomly picked 10 to-
be-cracked accounts, each with three pass-images. 30 partic-
ipants were divided into 10 groups, each with 3 participants.
Each group was asked to crack one account. We simulated
the owners of these 10 accounts to log into PassMatrix two
times and screenshot the entire login processes. These two
login records of each account along with an answer sheet
were given to three participants. They were asked to crack
(identify) the pass-square in each pass-image from the given
two login records. 25 participants returned their answer
sheets after two weeks.
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Feedback from participants showed that no one was able
to get any clue from the two login records. For each pass-
image, they couldn’t figure out the location of the pass-
square since they didn’t know the login indicator of the
image. The given two login records didn’t make it easier to
crack the pass-squares because the operations on different
pass-images within a login trial are independent, and the
operations on the same pass-image in two different login
trials are also independent. Most of them said that they
just filled out the answer sheet by random guessing or hot-
spot guessing. Each participant had ten chances to guess
the pass-squares in the given three pass-images, thus we
received 250 guessing cases. The participant was considered
successful if he got any answer case (out of 10 guessing
cases) correct on all three pass-squares. As the result showed
in Table 6, none of these 250 guessing cases were correct
on all three pass-squares, 1 case had correct guesses on two
pass-squares, 23 cases guessed right on one pass-square, and
all other 226 cases totally failed to guess any.
TABLE 6
Result of cracking PassMatrix.
Number of case (250 in total)
Success (3 correct) 0
Fail
(2 correct) 1
(1 correct) 23
(0 correct) 226
We further investigated the experimental data and found
out that there were some more likely selected squares in
each image probably because they are more memorable,
obvious or unique. Therefore, some pass-images were rel-
atively easier to guess due to the fact of lacking abundant
objects in that image. This hot-spot problem [46], [47] is
common for most graphical-based authentication schemes.
We chose three representative pass-images from our image
list to demonstrate the hot-spot problem. Two of these
three images are relatively more complex and contain rich
information, whereas the other one is an image of scenery
with a simple vision. 6 out of 25 returned password cracking
answer sheets were actually guessing the pass-squares on
these three images. With 10 guessing cases per answer sheet,
there were a total of 60 guessing cases. Figure 15 shows
the password guessing statistics, where the number within
a square represents the number of times the square were
selected as part of a guessed password. The squares selected
as possible passwords in the first two images are relatively
more uniformly distributed over 38.96% and 44.16% of
the total area respectively. However, in the third image,
the squares selected are concentrated in only 28.57% area
of the image. The squares with red frames are the real
pass-squares set by participants in the registration phase.
Some of these real pass-squares were also selected by the
majority of password cracking participants as their guessed
passwords. This experiment showed that an attacker has a
higher probability (than a random guess) to break into an
account by conducting hot-spot guessing attacks.
Fig. 15. Possible pass-squares chosen by participants. A large number
in a square means the square is a hot spot.
7 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we evaluate the security of the proposed
authentication system against three types of attacks: random
guess attack, shoulder surfing attack, and smudge attack.
7.1 Random Guess Attack
To perform a random guess attack, the attacker randomly
tries each square as a possible pass-square for each pass-
image until a successful login occurs. The key security
determinants of the system are the number of pass-images
and the degree of discretization of each image. To quantify
the security of PassMatrix against random guess attacks,
we define the entropy of a password space as in equation
3. Table 7 defines the notations used in the equation. If
the entropy of a password space is k bits, there will be 2k
possible passwords in that space.
Entropy = log2((Dx ×Dy)i)n (3)
TABLE 7
The definition of notations used in equation 3.
Notation Definition
Dx The number of partitions in x-direction
Dy The number of partitions in y-direction
i=1 Obtain login indicators by touching the
screen with hand grasped
i=2 Obtain login indicators by predefined images
n The number of pass-images set by user
TABLE 8
The entropy (bits) of PassMatrix against random guess attacks and
corresponding entropy of text passwords and PIN passwords, varied
from 1 to 5 pass-images (or 1-5 click-point(s)).
n: Number of images 1 2 3 4 5
PassMatrix
7× 11 type 1 6.27 12.53 18.80 25.07 31.33
type 2 12.53 25.07 37.60 50.13 62.67
32× 20 type 1 9.32 18.64 27.97 37.29 46.61
type 2 18.64 37.29 55.93 74.58 93.22
Text Passwords 6.57 13.14 19.71 26.28 32.85
PIN 3.32 6.64 9.97 13.29 16.61
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In our implementation, we built a prototype of Pass-
Matrix on Android OS, and conducted the user study on
Samsung Nexus S, which is a device with a small screen.
Due to the size limitation, the tolerance squares are 60× 60
pixels, so that users can distinguish squares clearly. Since
the size of images is 420 × 660 pixels, we have 7 partitions
on the x-axis and 11 partitions on the y-axis, which means
we have a total of 7× 11 squares in each image.
Table 8 shows the entropies of PassMatrix type 1 (getting
login indicators by touching the screen with hand grasped)
and type 2 (getting login indicators through predefined
images) from one pass-image to five pass-images (1-5 click
points), as well as the corresponding entropies of text pass-
words and PIN passwords. We can see that the entropies
of type 1 are larger than those of PIN passwords. With 3
pass-images the entropy of our proposed system is 18.8
bits, which is larger than the entropy 18.57 bits of the
Android pattern screen lock [48], currently the primary
authentication mechanism of Android devices. For the type
2 of our proposed system, i.e., obtaining login indicators
through graph, random guess attackers require more effort
to crack the system because they need to discover not only
the correct pass-square but also the correct login indicator in
each grid. Even if attackers know the pass-square of a pass-
image, they still couldn’t break into the account without the
correct login indicator of that trial. Therefore, the entropies
of the PassMatrix type 2 systems are significantly larger than
those of PIN passwords and those of the Android pattern
screen lock with just two pass-images.
Furthermore, in some applications such as the OS user
login or web applications on PCs/laptops with big screens,
where images with high resolution can be displayed en-
tirely on the screen without scroll bars, we can set a high
discretization degree for images to increase the security
strength of PassMatrix. For instance, with the size of 40×40
pixels for each square, a 1280×800 image is divided into 32
and 20 partitions on the x-axis and on the y-axis respectively,
so that the entropy can be increased to log2(32× 20)n.
7.2 Shoulder Surfing Attack
Due to the fact that shoulder surfing has been a real threat
to authentication systems with either textual or graphical
passwords, many novel authentication schemes were pro-
posed to protect systems from this attack. Unfortunately,
most of them were unsuccessful to alleviate the threat if
the shoulder-surfing attack is camera-based. For instance,
some schemes such as PIN-entry method [34] and spy-
resistant keyboard [19] were designed based on the difficul-
ties of short-term memory. Camera-based shoulder surfing
attacks can easily crack the passwords of these schemes.
The password spaces of other schemes such as those in
CAPTCHA-based method [24], Pass-icons [18] and Color-
rings [25] can be narrowed down by camera-based shoulder
surfing attacks.
The proposed authentication system PassMatrix takes
full advantage of adding extra information to obfuscate the
login process, using an approach to point out the locations
of pass-squares implicitly instead of typing or clicking on
password objects directly. Since the horizontal and vertical
bars are circulative and thus cover the entire area of the
image, the password space will not be narrowed down even
if the whole authentication process is recorded by attackers.
Furthermore, the login indicator for each pass-image varies
so that each pass-image is an independent case. Thus, no
pattern can be extracted from a set of pass-images in an
authentication trial, neither from multiple login processes.
With the above security features, PassMatrix should be
strong enough to resist shoulder surfing attacks, even if the
attacks are camera-equipped.
7.3 Smudge Attack
A smudge attack [39] is an implicit attack where attackers
attempt to extract sensitive information from recent users’
input by inspecting smudges left on touch screens. Since
both the horizontal and vertical bars in PassMatrix are scrol-
lable, shifting on any element within the bar can circulate
the whole bar. Thus, users do not have to shift the bars by
touching the login indicators. The smudge left by users may
be quite fixed, but it only indicates the habitual stretching
range of the thumb or finger. The length of the smudge left
on the screen also provides no useful information since the
login indicator is generated randomly for each pass-image
and the permutations of elements on both bars are also
randomly re-arranged in each pass-image and in each login
session. Therefore, the proposed PassMatrix is immune from
smudge attacks.
8 CONCLUSION
8.1 Discussion
Although we discretized each image into a grid of 7 × 11,
which holds 77 squares per image, we still think it is not
secure enough to resist against brute force attacks or random
guessing attacks. According to the result of questionnaires
in the user study, users expressed that they prefer to use
only 1 to 2 pass-images for screen lock after considering the
trade-off between security and usability. This means that the
entropies of PassMatrix in screen lock will be 6.27 bits and
12.53 bits for one pass-image and two pass-images respec-
tively, and can be strengthened to 12.53 and 25.07 bits when
obtaining login indicators through the graphical method. In
order to be more secure than the existing Android pattern
password with entropy 18.57 bits against brute force attacks,
users have to set two pass-images and use the graphical
method to obtain the one-time login indicators.
Like most of other graphical password authentication
systems, PassMatrix is vulnerable to random guess attacks
based on hot-spot analyzing. This weakness can be im-
proved by letting users upload their own images and there-
fore make it more difficult for attackers to collect statistics
of hot-spots. Moreover, because images with less indepen-
dent objects usually suffer more on the hot-spot problem,
carefully selecting images with rich objects can alleviate the
hot-spot based random guess attacks.
Here we summary the features of PassMatrix. Compared
with DAS [6], PassPoints [7] and Marcos’s finger-drawn
doodles [33], PassMatrix is strong enough to resist shoulder
surfing attacks, even if the attacks are camera-equipped.
And the PIN-entry method [34], FakePointer [35], Wieden-
back’s scheme [36] and Color Rings [25] do not have enough
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computational complexity while facing to random guess
attack, which PassMatrix can withstand.
8.2 Conclusion
With the increasing trend of web services and apps, users
are able to access these applications anytime and anywhere
with various devices. In order to protect users’ digital prop-
erty, authentication is required every time they try to access
their personal account and data. However, conducting the
authentication process in public might result in potential
shoulder surfing attacks. Even a complicated password can
be cracked easily through shoulder surfing. Using tradi-
tional textual passwords or PIN method, users need to
type their passwords to authenticate themselves and thus
these passwords can be revealed easily if someone peeks
over shoulder or uses video recording devices such as cell
phones.
To overcome this problem, we proposed a shoulder-
surfing resistant authentication system based on graphi-
cal passwords, named PassMatrix. Using a one-time login
indicator per image, users can point out the location of
their pass-square without directly clicking or touching it,
which is an action vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks.
Because of the design of the horizontal and vertical bars that
cover the entire pass-image, it offers no clue for attackers
to narrow down the password space even if they have
more than one login records of that account. Furthermore,
we implemented a PassMatrix prototype on Android and
carried out user experiments to evaluate the memorability
and usability. The experimental result showed that users can
log into the systemwith an average of 1.64 tries (Median=1),
and the Total Accuracy of all login trials is 93.33% even two
weeks after registration. The total time consumed to log into
PassMatrix with an average of 3.2 pass-images is between
31.31 and 37.11 seconds and is considered acceptable by
83.33% of participants in our user study.
Based on the experimental results and survey data,
PassMatrix is a novel and easy-to-use graphical pass-
word authentication system, which can effectively alleviate
shoulder-surfing attacks. In addition, PassMatrix can be ap-
plied to any authentication scenario and device with simple
input and output capabilities. The survey data in the user
study also showed that PassMatrix is practical in the real
world.
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